The other is essential so he/she/it must be negotiated with rather than destroyed

Greg Desilet Says: May 2nd, 2007 at 2:43 pm For Derrida, there is no escape from metaphysics (differance and the structure of the trace). But we can (and will by default) choose which metaphysics. Metaphysics as the question of “the real” appears, for Derrida, to involve an assessment of the nature of the structure between oppositional tensions. Derrida’s investigations continually return him to the presence/absence structure of the trace. This structure appears to him to be rock bottom. He thinks it may be the best “fit” for reality but he also understands that this reality does not compel us to arrive at an answer that can be clearly understood to be certain.

As with most questions and “texts,” reality offers a measure of irreducible undecidability. Therefore, believing that something is true need not be the only reason for believing it, while nevertheless being among the most important reasons. Something else needs to be added in order for the metaphysical choice to gain in persuasiveness over competing alternatives. This “something else” is value. Every metaphysical judgment is a kind of “choice,” and promotes or advances one way of seeing over another and, of necessity, one value or set of values over another.

Derrida claims that his choice (deconstruction), because of what it entails with regard to the essential status of the other, presents a metaphysical option that effectively promotes less violence than other alternatives. All other things being equal then, his view offers the best complement of truth and value—among those who value less “violence”—or, to use another of his words, more “justice”—in community. This reflects one of Derrida’s most unusual and provocative statements: “deconstruction is justice.” For Derrida, it’s important not only to understand the adequacy of a metaphysical position in relation to “reality” but also to understand its implications with regard to the values it promotes and its probable consequences for individual and communal life.

But, in keeping with the concern you raise, I don’t believe Derrida would have us believe a particular way solely or primarily on the basis of the values it appears to promote. The interesting thing about his position is that it seems to provide ontological ground apart from merely ethical ground for holding to a version of the golden rule (i.e., the other is essential so he/she/it must be negotiated with rather than destroyed).