Greg Desilet Says: May 3rd, 2007 at 11:17 am Hi Alan. An interesting passage from Aurobindo. Because of my current interest in Derrida, I naturally compare it to his position (as I understand it). It looks in some ways similar but there may be an important difference. The view Aurobindo presents here repeats, I believe, what amounts to an Aristotelian view of essence and oppositional relation. For Aristotle oppositional relation is structured such that there are instances (attainable to real experience) of “pure X” and “pure Y” and, as if in the middle, instances of a mixture “XY”. This is how I see Aurobindo understanding his categories of nondual, dual, and qualified dual. Derrida, on the other hand, presents an alternative structure for oppositional relation where X and Y always penetrate or accompany each other such that X never occurs without Y (and vice versa) and X can never be reduced to Y (and vice versa) (think here also of oscillation and superposition as in the particle/wave phenomenon in physics). Thus, there is no essence of X that purely excludes Y (unlike in Aristotelian metaphysics where the essence of X would exclude any trace or presence of Y). Although Aurobindo’s broad view of “the absolute absoluteness of That” appears to be inclusionary, it accepts exclusionary ontological categories such as “pure X” and “pure Y,” states of X that exclude Y and states of Y that exclude X (as, for example, when he refers to “the experience of a pure consciousness in an unqualified oneness”). Derrida finds, even at the ontological level of lived experience, that all states of being or consciousness are nonexclusionary. This position accords with experience while also avoiding the transcendentalism implicit in Aurobindo’s metaphysics of oppositional relation and the quandaries of traditional metaphysics to which this view ultimately returns us (while appearing to do otherwise). In other words, what Aurobindo proposes here seems to offer only a repetition of the traditional metaphysics of presence that postmodernism and deconstruction in particular have argued against. alan kazlev Says: May 4th, 2007 at 12:40 am Hi Greg, Thanks for your thoughtful comments. I am at rather a disadvantage here, because I really don’t know about pomo or Derrida! Nor do I have more than a very basic knowledge of Aristotle. So I am sure there are many students of Sri Aurobindo who are far better qualified to reply here than myself. My reading of what Sri Aurobindo is saying is that he is referring to the Supreme which is beyond all mental conceptions whatsoever, and all the limitations that they entail. That is why he says “not limited by our ideas of unity, not limited by our ideas of multiplicity“. And “the vain labour of enslaving to our mental distinctions and definitions the absolute freedom of the Divine Infinite”This is probably not much different to Nagarjuna’s Madhyamika school that likewise rejected the possibility that words can define the Absolute Reality. Pseudo-Dionysian negative theology is also similar, but from a Christian perspective. Pseudo-Dionysius derived it from Proclus, who in turn got it from Plotinus. See also Negative Theology in the Nag Hamadi Library (Gnosticism). However, unlike the Madyamikas etc, Sri Aurobindo also provides many positive statements; e.g. his description of the Supramental state elsewhere in The Life Divine, and his mystical accounts in Synthesis of Yoga. Of course there is always the problem of misunderstandings arising through using words to formulate experiences that transcend words (and hence also transcend the rational intellect and aristotlean categories of logic). Didn’t Wittgenstein - who unfortunately I am also not an authority on - say that in this situation it is best to remain silent? I like the Zen parable of the finger pointing at the moon. All these philosophical definitions are just metaphors, analogies, not even that. They point to something, but cannot define it, because the thing they point to is beyond their very nature. Thus in mysticism and esotericism there is the paradox of the need for philosophy to refer to something that cannot be defined using philosophy. Marko has made a useful comment regarding the distinction between philosophy and teaching.I also have to respectfully disagree with you (and with Edward and pomo and Wilber), regarding metaphysics as being something outmoded and hence to be rejected or superceded by more recent mental-philosophical insights (whether derived from deconstructionism or Wilberism or anything else). Here I find Gebser’s critique of the myth of progress useful. To me, metaphysics - when tied to spiritual practice - is a highly positive endeavour. But at the same time, it is still a mental formulation, and hence serves the role of being, once again, the finger pointing at the moon, not be confused with the moon itself.
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